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Abstract
As the use of the internet for commercial purposes con-
tinues to grow, so do the number of security threats which
attempt to disrupt online systems[1][8][9]. A number of
these threats are in fact unintended[11]. For example, a
careless employee might drop a cup of coffee onto essen-
tial equipment. However, when compared to the brick and
mortar world, the internet offers would-be attackers a more
anonymous environment in which to operate. Also, the free
availability of hacking tools makes it possible even for the
curious teenager to carry out dangerous attacks[3]. Despite
this ever-present threat however, it is all too often the case
that security is dealt with (if at all) after a web application
has been developed[2]. This is mainly due to our software
development heritage whereby companies prefer to focus on
the functionality of new systems because that provides an
immediate return on investment.
As a precursor to proposing an framework for building secu-
rity into web applications, this paper presents an ontology
of threat to web applications. The thinking behind this is
that much the same as in the military world, one needs to
have as much intelligence about the enemy as possible, the
same can be argued in the case of online security threats.
Such an ontology would enable stake holder in online appli-
cations to take less of a reactive stance but instead be more
proactive by being aware what’s out there.
Keywords: Security, Software Quality Assurance, Web Ap-
plications, E-Commerce
1. Introduction
W. Edwards Deming stated several years ago that “the
quality of a product is directly related to the quality of the
process used to create it”[4]. Although Deming’s work in-
volved production work during World War II, his statement
holds true today when dealing with complex software sys-
tems. As part of a wider body of work dealing with the
rapid development of high-quality e-commerce systems[6],
the authors of this paper identified the five most important
quality attributes in e-commerce systems of which the most
important was deemed to be security[5].
Despite the importance of security, it is still often the case
that high-profile breaches surface in the news with many
more going unannounced[3][8][9]. It appears that develop-
ment companies focus mostly on functionality when devel-
oping a system since this is perceived to provide an imme-
diate return on investment. However, a study amongst 350
online shoppers, by the authors of this paper revealed that
86% of potential customers would not shop at a site if they
were not confident in its security capabilities[5]. Also, 36%
of online shoppers consider security considerations as the
primary reason for choosing a brick and mortar store over
an online equivalent[5]. This leads to the observation that
web application developers are not really delivering a prod-
uct of good quality when they concentrate on functionality,
but rather they deliver one of perceived quality. The lack
of focus on security throughout a web application’s devel-
opment life cycle often leads to a vulnerable first release of
that application[2]. Considering potential customers’ secu-
rity awareness, this may prove to be a costly mistake.
Through research in psychology, it has been established
that humans are able to handle large quantities of infor-
mation much more efficiently if they are able to classify it
into a manageable number of categories[15]. In light of this,
the authors of this paper argue that managing thousands
of security threats would be far easier if each threat could
be seen within the context of a category of similar threats.
Once a threat has been placed in this context, it is far easier
to manage it by applying the same treatment that would
be applied to similar threat albeit slightly tailored to any
particular characteristics of the individual threat.
In this paper, it is being argued that there is a need for
a security ontology of online security threats. The authors
also go on to propose such an ontology.
2. Overview of the proposed ontology
At its highest level, the ontology consists of 6 compo-
nents as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1. A high-level overview of the pro-
posed Ontology
Each of these components is discussed in the following sec-
tions.
2.1 Identification Information
Every security threat needs to be identified. The iden-
tification information component of the proposed ontology
provides for this. It is being proposed that threats be given
a unique identifier (for use in database storage of informa-
tion), a name, and a freetext description. This is depicted
in figure .
2.2 Active/Passive Threat
The second component of the proposed ontology seeks
to indicate whether a threat is active or passive. An ac-
tive threat is in essence an intentional threat by someone
with malicious intentions. This may include a hacker inten-
tionally trying to gain access to credit card information, a
Figure 2. The Identification Information Compo-
nent
virus trying to corrupt your operating environment, and so
on. On the other hand, a passive threat is unintentional.
That is to say it happened by accident. Instances of unin-
tentional threats may include dropping a coffee mug over
a server, maintenance personnel disabling power lines to
essential equipment, and so on.
2.3 Authorisation
The authorisation component seeks to identify what type
of user would carry out a particular attack. Three possi-
bilities exist and these are shown in figure ??. Firstly, a
user could be authorised. This means that a user has been
delegated rights in the environment, on a system, or on a
network and chooses to abuse of these rights in carrying
out an attack. The second possibility is that of an unau-
thorised users gaining access to the environment through
some weakness and thus causing havoc on the system. Fi-
nally, there is also the possibility of an impersonation. An
impersonator could be a user, hacker or even a computer
program which manages to gain access by taking on the
identity or rights of another authorised user.
Figure 3. The Authorisation Component
2.4 Vulnerability Classes
The term vulnerability class refers to one of five classes
which have been defined in this ontology as broadly cover-
ing all possible vulnerabilities which a security threat can
exploit. shown in the figure 4. As a minimum, a threat
will have a primary vulnerability class assigned to it. This
refers to the vulnerability which is most exploited by the
threat. Should a threat exploit more than one vulnerability,
there is the option to define additional secondary vulnera-
bility classes.
Figure 4. Types Security Threats
A web application may be compromised by threats which
exploit vulnerabilities relating to any one of the categories
shown in figure 4. All too often, one may be lulled into
a false sense of security by emphasising security against
threats on one of the above-mentioned levels. For exam-
ple, one could feel that using secure communications[12] is
enough to ensure a particular application’s security. How-
ever, secure communications only assure privacy at the net-
work level and a private web conversation with a hacker will
not deter him/her from exploiting vulnerabilities of a differ-
ent nature. The following is a brief discussion of the threat
categories (sometimes referred to as levels) shown in figure
4.
At the physical level , one must ensure that the locations
where hardware (be it for deployment or development pur-
poses) resides are physically secured[16]. Any physical in-
trusion into such a location may result in interruption of
service, stolen data, and so on. In such cases, intruders
may not necessarily be outsiders but could also be insiders
(e.g. disgruntled employees).
Another category of security threats involves exploiting vul-
nerabilities at the network level . Such threats attempt
to manipulate shortcomings in communication protocols to
disrupt service and/or gain access to private information.
Appropriate actions must be taken to prevent this from
happening[11].
The operating environment where a web application is
hosted is also vulnerable to attacks. Vulnerabilities may
be present in any components ranging from the operating
system [17] to any other web-enabled component such as
web server software, mail server software, and so on[18].
Again, one can easily imagine a scenario where an appli-
cation is highly secured by developers, only to be breached
by attacking its operating system instead of the application
itself.
The category of application level threats refers to threats
which exploit vulnerabilities within the web application it-
self. SQL injection attacks, cross-site scripting and authentication-
related attacks are typical examples of threats which can be
found at this level[14][19]. It is beyond the scope of this pa-
per to explore the technical merits of such attacks.
Finally, one should discuss vulnerabilities at the human
level of security. Such vulnerabilities involve trusted hu-
man beings knowingly or unknowingly enabling outsiders
to breach a web application and access restricted data[20].
Numerous incidents have been reported whereby a techni-
cally secure web application was breached because an in-
sider was tricked into revealing information such as their
username and password (a technique commonly known as
social engineering). An effective security policy must ensure
that trusted users are in a position to repel any attempts
made to use them as a weak point within the application’s
security structure.
2.5 Damage
The damage component of the proposed ontology seeks
to identify what sort of damage would be caused by the
threat should it succeed in materialising. The following
possibilities have been extracted from a US government re-
port on information security risks[7]. Should new types of
damage surface in future, these should be included in the
ontology. A security threat can cause damage in one or
more of the following categories:
• Disclosure of information
• Modification of information
• Destruction of information
• Degredation of service
• Denial of service
• Website defacement
2.6 Severity
The severity component gives an indication of the amount
of harm and/or fallout which would result from the threat
if it materialises. It is proposed that this information be
categorised as low, medium or high. A low severity level
indicates that the consequences of a materialisation of this
threat would have little repercussion on the web applica-
tions ability to keep functioning and on its reputation. An
example of this might involve a relatively harmless adware
program managing to install itself on a server. A threat
with medium severity is one that causes a degradation in
service without completely disabling the site or one that
causes damage or loss which can be recovered. Examples
might include minor website defacements, or loss of data
which is regularly backed up and can thus be retrieved. Fi-
nally, a high severity level indicates threats which severely
impinge on a web application’s stability and/or its users’
privacy and security. Examples include hackers gaining ac-
cess to clients’ personal information, viruses corrupting or
erasing data in such a way that it cannot be retrieved, an
so on.
2.7 Recommended Actions
Finally, one should discuss the recommended actions com-
ponent of the proposed ontology. This component has three
sub-components as shown in figure 5.
Figure 5. The Recommended Actions Component
The preventive sub-component refers to actions which can
be taken to prevent the treat from materialising. A list
of generic actions such as deploy firewall solution, validate
all application inputs, etc is defined but due to length re-
strictions cannot be included in this paper. Since preventive
measures may sometimes fail, the ontology also seeks to de-
fine a list of detective actions. These actions/mechanisms
will be put in place to detect the occurrence of a security
threat. Finally, the proposed ontology defines a number of
possible reactive actions which are to be taken in the case
of a materialisation of a particular security threat. Again,
a number of generic actions have been defined but cannot
be included here.
3. Conclusion and Future Work
It is believed that the ontology proposed here will prove
to be very useful once a sufficient number of threats have
been defined and place within it. Future work in this area
will start off with this very task. However, the final aim of
this line of work within the SEPI research group is to de-
velop a multi-tier, multi-role security framework which will
be developed. This framework will provide a process based
way of securing web applications against security threats
which are defined within the framework proposed in this
paper.
4. References
[1] Glisson W. B., Welland, R., “Web Development
Evolution: The Assimilation of Web Engineering
Security”, Proceedings of the 3rd Latin American
Web Congress, IEEE Press, 2005.
[2] Gaur N., “Assessing the Security of Your Web
Applications”, Linux Journal, April 2000
[3] Morrisdale P.A., “The Six Dumbest Ideas in
Computer Security”,
http://www.ranum.com/security/
computer security/editorials/dumb/
[4] Rakitin S. R., “Software Verification and Validation:
A practitioner’s Guide”, Boston: Artech House, 1997
[5] Cachia E., Micallef M., “Towards Effectively
Appraising Online Stores”, Proceeding of the
Software Engineering Knowledge Engineering
(SEKE) Conference, 2004
[6] Cachia E., Micallef M., “Towards a RAD Framework
for E-Commerce Systems”, International Conference
on Web Information Systems and Technologies, 2006
[7] United States General Accounting Office,
“Information Security Risk Assessment - Practices of
Leading Organisations”, United States Government,
1999
[8] Deloitte, “2005 Global Security Survay”, Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu, 2005
[9] Gordon L. A., Loeb M. P., et al, “2005 CSI/FBI
Computer Crim Survey”, Computer Security
Institute, 2005
[10] Hersherb J., et al “Software quality and the
Capability Maturity Model”, Communications of the
ACM, June 1997
[11] Mackey D., “Web Security for Network and System
Administrators”, Thomson Course Technology, 2003
[12] Freier A. O., Karlton P., Kocher P. C., “The SSL
Protocol Version 3.0”, Netscape, 1996
[13] Schneider B., “Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a
Networked World”, John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2000
[14] “The Open Web Application Security Project”,
http://www.owasp.org/
[15] Antherton J. S. Learning and Teaching: Assimilation
and Accommodation
http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/assimacc.htm
,2005
[16] Diroff T.E., “The protection of computer facilities
and equipment: physical security”, ACM SIGMIS
Database, ACM, 1978
[17] Blakely R., “Hackers Uncover Biggest Microsoft
Vulnerability”, TimeOnline,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9075-
1968021,00.html,
2006
[18] Nagel B., “Microsoft Releases Out-of-Cycle Patch for
VML Flaw”,
http://www.redmondmag.com/news/article.asp?EditorialsID=7825,
2006
[19] Jovanovic N., Christopher K., Engin K., “Precise
Alias Analysis for Static Detection of Web
Application Vulnerabilities”, Proceedings of the ACM
SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages
and Analysis for Security, 2006
[20] Orgill G. et al, “The Urgency for Effective User Privacy-
education to Counter Social Engineering Attacks on Secure
Computer Systems”, Proceedings of the 5th conference on
Information technology education , ACM Press, 2004
